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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________ 
 
 
HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellants are three groups of plaintiffs whose 
separate actions were consolidated by the district court because 
they all claimed they were harmed by exposure to toxic wastes 
  
appellee, the United States Army ("Army"), had deposited in lands 
once a part of the New Cumberland Army Depot ("Depot").  In all 
three cases, plaintiffs sought class certification, but the 
district court denied class certification.1  One group of 
plaintiffs consists of workers for the township ("Township 
Workers") who converted the area the Army used as a landfill into 
a soccer field after the Army had transferred it to the township 
that adjoins the Depot.  The second group consists primarily of 
residents living near the landfill (the "Neighbor Plaintiffs").  
The third group are persons, primarily children, who played 
soccer (the "Soccer Plaintiffs") on the field created on the site 
of the Army's landfill.  This third group includes two children 
of the Elliott family, Todd and Tracey (the "Elliotts").  Tracey 
suffers from leukemia and Todd from enlarged lymph nodes. 
 Except for the Elliotts, the primary relief all parties 
seek is medical monitoring.  They appeal the district court's 
final order for the Army on all their claims, which was entered 
following orders granting the Army's motions for summary 
judgment.  Their appeals raise several important issues. 
Ultimately, we will affirm the orders of the district court with 
respect to all appellants except the Elliotts, the only 
plaintiffs who have been able to produce evidence of actual harm 
by medical evidence showing the Elliott children are suffering 
from conditions that require medical attention beyond the medical 
                     
1
.  Basically, the named plaintiffs sought to include all persons 
exposed to any toxic substances the Army had deposited in the 
affected lands. 
  
services everyone in the general population should have.  Our 
reasons, which differ somewhat from those of the district court, 
follow.2 
 
 I.  Factual History 
 A.  The History of Marsh Run Park 
 1. NCAD's Use of the Land as a Landfill 
 The New Cumberland Army Depot is located just east of 
the Harrisburg Airport on about 974 acres of land, between the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike to the south and some railroad tracks and 
the Susquehanna River to the north.  From 1917 until the mid-
                     
2
.  We may summarily dispose of two of the arguments appellants 
raise on appeal.  We hold that their argument that the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied class certification 
lacks merit and so will affirm the order denying class 
certification.  We also reject appellants' argument that the 
district court erred in denying "Plaintiffs' Motion for Emergency 
Relief," relating to a discovery motion filed in a separate case, 
O'Neal v. United States, No. 1:CV-90-1073 (order filed Nov. 16, 
1993).  The district court had consolidated O'Neal with the 
instant case for discovery purposes.  It held that counsel for 
the Depot correctly sought to preclude plaintiffs' counsel from 
contacting current or former Depot employees about the case 
without first complying with 32 C.F.R. § 516.35(d).  This 
regulation requires an individual seeking information from 
present or former employees of the Army to make the request in 
writing to appropriate Department of Defense personnel.  It is 
known as the Touhy provision after United States ex rel. Touhy v. 
Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951).  The United States argues this order 
is not appealable because it was entered in a separate case not 
before the Court in these appeals.  Because O'Neal was 
consolidated with Redland for discovery purposes, the United 
States also argues that the motion was untimely because discovery 
had ended and summary judgment had been entered in Redland on all 
issues but one when the court denied "Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Emergency Relief."  Assuming that the order denying discovery in 
O'Neal is properly before us, we nevertheless hold that this 
argument also lacks merit. 
  
1950's, the Depot used a fourteen-acre tract of land in its 
extreme southeastern part as a landfill to dispose of various 
wastes.  The former landfill is bordered by a railroad embankment 
and the Susquehanna River to the north and by Marsh Run Creek 
("Creek") and an access road on the south.  A drainage pipe 
carrying storm water from the Depot once emptied out onto the 
western part of the tract.  When the landfill was closed in the 
mid-1950's, Depot employees covered the debris with eighteen 
inches of dirt taken from the bank of the Creek and then spread 
coal ashes over the landfill's surface, adding another six to 
seven inches of cover.  The Depot's perimeter fence was moved 
westward so that the land, then known as Marsh Run Field, was no 
longer within the fence.  The Depot remains adjacent to the west 
end of Marsh Run Field. 
 
 2. Transfer of the Land to Fairview Township and 
Conversion Into a Soccer Field 
 
 In 1970, an executive order directed the Army to 
identify and dispose of its excess acreage.  The Depot identified 
its former landfill as excess and engaged in negotiations with 
adjoining Fairview Township ("Township") officials to transfer 
the former landfill to the Township for use as a public 
recreational area, which would include soccer fields.  The land 
was formally transferred to the Township in 1976.  According to 
both Army officials and Township employee, E. Robert McCollum 
("McCollum"), it was common knowledge that the area was once used 
as a landfill by the Depot.  Indeed, the tract was commonly 
  
referred to as "Pineapple Junction" because of old canned goods 
that were known to have been disposed of there.  No one from the 
Depot or the Army informed the Township that the landfill 
contained potentially hazardous or toxic substances.  Whether the 
Army knew the landfill was contaminated before the transfer is a 
point of contention.3 
 In 1981, the Township began excavating and leveling the 
site, now known as Marsh Run Park ("Park"), for use as a soccer 
field.  The soccer field was completed in 1982 and was used by 
the Redland Soccer Club from 1982 until the Park was closed on 
August 28, 1987.  
 
 3.  The Park Closure and Tests for Contamination 
 In the 1960's and 1970's environmental concerns 
intensified in this nation.  New laws and regulations reflected 
                     
3
.  This issue is the focus of plaintiffs' argument that the 
district court erred in holding that the government's deliberate 
process privilege justified the Army's refusal to disclose or 
discuss certain internal records.  We discuss that issue infra in 
Part VIII of this opinion, where we conclude that the district 
court did not adequately explain the reasons for its ruling.  We 
note there, however, that this discovery related not to the 
nature or toxicity of the substances the Army deposited in the 
landfill, the subject of other discovery and extensive testing, 
but rather to the Army's knowledge of their presence.  That 
knowledge, or lack of it, seems to us to have little relevance to 
the plaintiffs' medical monitoring claim.  See also infra 
footnote 20.  We are thus satisfied that any error in this 
respect, if indeed the order refusing discovery, as opposed to 
the failure fully to explicate its rationale, is erroneous, does 
not materially affect the parties' medical monitoring claims, 
which are the subject of the claims of all plaintiffs except the 
Elliotts, who also claim standard tort damages, including damages 
for pain and suffering. 
  
this growing concern, and the Army began investigating how wastes 
were disposed of at its facilities.  The Depot was included.  In 
1972, the United States Army Environmental Hygiene Agency did a 
study on the Depot's wastewater discharges' effect on local 
streams and waters, including the Susquehanna River and the 
Creek, a stream which flows through the whole southern end of the 
Depot.  This study concluded that the Depot's discharges had no 
apparent deleterious impact on the Susquehanna River, but that 
they did have "a significant, adverse impact" on the plant and 
animal life in the part of the Creek lying within the Depot's 
boundaries.  In June of 1978, the Army recommended that the 
waters of the Creek within the Depot be closed to recreational 
use because low levels of polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") had 
been detected in them. 
 Most of the environmental studies done at the Depot 
thereafter focused on lands within the Depot and excluded the 
closed landfill, which was no longer Depot property.  In 
September of 1977, Depot officials discovered a document 
indicating a one-pound container of potassium cyanide, a toxic 
substance, had been buried in the landfill.  Depot officials 
contacted the Township and asked for permission to dig it up and 
remove it.  Depot officials were unable to locate any other 
documents detailing the contents of the landfill, and to date all 
its contents have not been identified.4 
                     
4
.  A United States Army Environmental Hygiene Agency Interim 
Final Report (Draft) dated December 14-17, 1987, called 
Groundwater Contamination Survey at New Cumberland Army Depot, 
listed "damaged canned goods" as the major item for disposal 
  
 
 a.  Woodward-Clyde Soil Testing Report Dated July, 1987 
 In 1986, the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
("Corps") hired Woodward-Clyde Consultants ("Woodward-Clyde") to 
perform soil testing at the former landfill to see whether any 
contamination existed there.  This was done pursuant to the 
Defense Environmental Restoration Account ("DERA"), a program 
established under 10 U.S.C.A. § 2701 et seq. (West 1983), to 
investigate and remedy environmental contamination at former 
Department of Defense sites.  The testing was done in March of 
1987 when the field was still being used by the Redland Soccer 
Club. 
 The parameters of the study were determined by the 
Corps.  Woodward-Clyde installed three monitoring wells 
surrounding, but not on, the landfill.  It dug five test pits:  
one in the cut area on the northern edge of the Park to obtain 
background soils, one in the area of the cyanide canister burial 
and the remaining three on the field itself.  The test pits in 
the field were four to five feet in depth.  Two samples were 
removed from each pit, one near the surface and one at mid-depth.  
Surface soil samples were also taken, but not from the soccer 
(..continued) 
along with "damaged, out-of-specification or empty containers 
from such materials as napalm thickener (aluminum naphthalate 
soaps), decontaminating agent noncorrosive, decontaminating 
solution DS-2) (sic), bleaches, and clothing impregnating 
compounds (acetylene tetrachloride or chlorinated aniline in a 
chlorinated paraffin binder)."  Appellants' Appendix ("App.") at 
1013a.  A United States Environmental Protection Agency Report 
dated July 9, 1988 speculates that acids, solvents, fuels and 
plating solutions may also have been disposed of in the landfill. 
  
field area.  Groundwater was sampled in the monitoring wells, 
surface water was sampled at two locations along the site's 
boundaries and samples were obtained from in or near the Creek. 
 The testing demonstrated a "significant presence of 
contaminants in some areas" of the Park and contamination in most 
of the soil and sediment samples.  Test pit soil samples 
contained organic contaminants and all surface soils contained 
elevated levels of petroleum hydrocarbons.  Groundwater samples 
contained elevated concentrations of metals.  Woodward-Clyde 
recommended further testing, including testing of the surface 
soils from the playing fields and surrounding areas "where fill 
is visible at the surface."  Appellants' Appendix ("App.") at 
950a.  Following receipt of the Woodward-Clyde report, the Army 
and the Township, by mutual agreement, closed the Park to further 
public use and the Army repossessed the land in order to conduct 
additional testing.   
 
 b.  Corps' Public Health Evaluation Dated June 1988 
 On May 25, 1988, nine months after the Park was closed 
to public use, the Corps sampled surface soils from seven areas 
on the soccer fields and one off site in an effort to determine 
whether the surface soils of the former landfill presented 
possible human health hazards.  The samples were analyzed for the 
presence of volatile organic compounds ("VOCs"), semi-volatile 
organics, PCBs, metals and cyanide.  In four of the eight 
locations low levels of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons ("PAHs") 
were detected.  Lead was the only metal detected at levels 
  
significantly above those found in the off-site sample.  The 
report considered exposure pathways of dust inhalation, skin 
contact and inadvertent ingestion of soil by hand-to-mouth 
contact.  The Corps concluded that the sampling results showed 
"no apparent increase in health risk to the children playing at 
Marsh Run Park" because the concentrations of contaminants were 
within the acceptable limits proposed by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). 
 
c.   EPA Soil and Groundwater Sampling Report Dated July 29, 1988 
 On June 11, 1988, the Army determined that the former 
landfill was an appropriate site for a remedial investigation 
study, which was also to be performed by the Corps as part of the 
Defense Environmental Restoration Program.  Meanwhile, EPA 
officials also decided to conduct soil and groundwater sampling 
at the Park and make a detailed magnetic survey.  Surface samples 
were taken by EPA on June 22 and 23, 1988 at ten on-site 
locations, stratified soil samples at three locations and 
groundwater samples at three on-site monitoring wells.  EPA 
concluded that the Park's surface soils were contaminated with 
lead and PAHs, its subsurface soils with lead and VOCs and its 
groundwater with VOCs.  The magnetic survey showed three possible 
drum burial sites in the former landfill. 
 
  
 d.  EA Engineering Remedial Investigation Report Dated January 
     1990 
 
 In conducting its remedial investigation, the Corps 
contracted with EA Engineering, Science and Technology, Inc. ("EA 
Engineering").  EA Engineering agreed to identify potential 
sources of contamination, define the nature and extent of site 
contamination and any immediate offsite impact to ground water, 
surface water and air, and to assess downstream ground water and 
surface water for human health and environmental risks.  EA 
Engineering sampled waters from four nearby residential wells on 
August 31, 1989.  It sampled ground water and soils from 
monitoring wells in two separate phases in February and August of 
1989.  The record does not contain the entire EA Engineering 
Remedial Investigation Report, and it does not indicate when EA 
Engineering took the Creek surface water and sediment samples it 
analyzes in the Report.  EA Engineering did not sample the Park's 
surface soils but instead used the results of the Corps' and 
EPA's surface soils testing in May of 1988.  EA Engineering did 
not sample the waste fill itself but analyzed the surface soil 
and groundwater samples results to determine what contaminants 
might be flowing out from the waste fill.   
 EA Engineering concluded that the site was contaminated 
with PAHs but that the PAHs were not unique to the site.  It 
concluded the site was also contaminated with trace metals 
including barium, lead, copper and silver.  It also determined 
the fill was a potential source of VOCs.  It found VOCs in the 
bedrock aquifer beneath the site and determined the source of 
  
this contamination was probably the fill.  It found low-level 
VOCs discharging to the Creek upstream from and adjacent to the 
Park, but could not confirm whether this contamination was 
resulting from ground water flowing from the fill or from some 
other source.  EA Engineering also concluded the trace metals 
were emanating partially from the fill and some other source.  It 
found no contamination in any of the residential wells, all of 
which are hydraulically upgradient from the Park. 
 EA Engineering concluded that any contaminated ground 
water from the site would migrate north towards the Susquehanna 
River or flow into the adjacent Creek and that no residences are 
in the predicted migration path.  It also concluded that the 
Creek's surface waters upstream from the Park contained low-level 
volatile contaminants trichloroethane and 1,1,2,2-
tetrachloroethane, and that the upstream sediments contained 
low-level PAHs.  The Creek's waters adjacent to and downstream 
from the Park contained low-level volatiles of trichloroethane 
and 1,2-dichlorothene.  EA Engineering concluded that the source 
of these compounds was somewhere upstream, unrelated to the Park 
and that dust from the surface soils was not a significant 
exposure pathway because the field, when tested, was covered by 
dense grass. 
 As for human health risk, EA Engineering concluded that 
"the past use of Marsh Run Field as a soccer field . . . resulted 
in very little risk to the children using the field."  App. at 
1251a.  It concluded that there would be potential health risk 
from any ingestion of on-site ground water, but that such 
  
ingestion would be highly improbable because it was unlikely any 
residential use would be made of the site in the future.  
Finally, EA Engineering concluded there was no risk to any of the 
nearby residents because their wells were not contaminated and 
would not become contaminated in the future.  As for residents 
who may have eaten fish from the Creek, it concluded there was no 
carcinogenic risk.   
 
 B.  The Township Worker Plaintiffs 
 The Township worker plaintiffs consist of seven 
individuals who either performed the excavation and levelling 
work while the former landfill was being converted into a soccer 
field or who mowed the grass and performed maintenance work at 
the Park after the field was constructed.  Their deposition 
testimony and affidavits can be summarized as follows. 
 Sometime in 1980 or 1981, Fairview Township Engineer, 
Robert G. Hartman ("Hartman"), was assigned the task of 
landscaping the former landfill for recreational use as a soccer 
field.  He conducted a topographical and perimeter survey with a 
field crew.  The Township Workers then excavated and levelled the 
land over a four month period during the summer of 1981.  
 When the Township Workers first arrived at the site, it 
was covered by brush and trees and was swampy in some areas.  The 
Township Workers cleared the brush and trees and also removed 
what little topsoil was present at the site, which they put aside 
for later use.  As they began to grade the site and move earth 
from a higher section of land to the north, near the railroad 
  
tracks, to a lower section to the south in order to level the 
ground, they began to unearth "junk," including several barrels 
of white powder, drums, canisters, broken glass, old coffee mugs, 
utensils, cans, wood, a railroad rail and gas masks.  One of the 
Township Workers recalled someone digging test holes into the 
junk area and taking samples from them.  No one recalled any Army 
personnel being on site at any time during the work.   As 
excavation continued, the junk was covered up and used as part of 
the fill for the lower area.  The Township Workers estimated that 
a cap of an average of three feet of dirt from the higher area 
near the railroad embankment was placed over the junk.  After the 
fill was levelled, the Township Workers placed on-site topsoil 
and topsoil from off-site over the fill to a depth of two to six 
inches.  The field was then seeded.  The Township Workers 
testified they inhaled dust, waded through dirt and debris, sat 
in the dirt and ate their lunch there over the four-month period.  
One Township Worker recalled that his eyes burned or stung while 
he was running the grader and tearing up new soil and that the 
burning did not stop until the newly torn up soil was reburied.  
 During the excavation and leveling work, some of these 
same Township Workers constructed a drainage swale to redirect 
water flowing out of a pipe carrying storm drainage waters out of 
the Depot.  During excavation for the swale, the Township Workers 
exposed groundwater.  Some of the Township Workers performed 
repairs on a bridge over the Creek and removed debris from the 
Creek.  
  
 A Township Worker named David A. Kupp ("Kupp") was 
responsible for mowing the field after it was constructed.  He 
mowed once a week for approximately five hours.  Kupp recalled 
the field as dry and only sparsely covered with grass and 
remembered the mower kicking up dirt and dust from the surface of 
the field about 20% of the time.  He also spent several hours 
painting the bridge over the Creek while he stood on the banks 
and rocks and in the waters of the Creek. 
 None of the Township Workers are currently suffering 
from any physical ailment that they claim is the result of their 
exposure.  There is no evidence in the record that any of them 
have been examined for health problems related to their exposure 
at the Park or that any doctor has personally informed them that 
they have an increased health risk because of exposure to toxic 
substances while working at the Park. 
 
 C.  The Neighbor Plaintiffs 
 The Neighbor Plaintiffs are twelve residents living in 
the immediate vicinity of the Park and the Creek, plus some 
relatives who regularly visited them.  Some testified in 
depositions or affidavits that they waded in the Creek, fished in 
it and ate fish they caught there.  Several testified they hunted 
in the former landfill area and ate pheasant, rabbit, squirrel or 
turtle they caught or shot there.  Most of the Neighbors used the 
Park for walking or other forms of exercise. 
 On May 8, 1988, the Department of Environmental 
Resources ("DER") tested residential wells for trace metals and 
  
VOCs and found none of the wells were contaminated.  One 
Neighbor, however, testified that her well water was tested in 
1990 by her employer and found to contain high concentrations of 
several chemicals, including lead.  Another Neighbor testified 
that he was told his well water did not pose a health risk but 
contained traces of contaminants.  He and his family stopped 
drinking from it.  None of the Neighbors are currently suffering 
from any illness as a result of their exposure, nor have any been 
personally advised by a doctor that they have an increased health 
risk as a result of such exposure. 
 
 D.  The Soccer Plaintiffs 
 The remaining 128 plaintiffs are members of the Redland 
Soccer Association ("Redland"), adults and children who used the 
Park on a regular basis from 1982 to 1987 for soccer activities, 
and members of their immediate families who were with them during 
activities at the Park.  Some of the Soccer Plaintiffs testified 
they helped build the soccer field in 1982, picking rocks and 
moving dirt around the field and then raking and seeding it, 
setting goalposts and lining the field in order to get it ready 
for play in 1983.  This took five or six weekends with about six 
hours work per day. 
 One of the Soccer Plaintiffs coached a team for 
Redland.  He testified that his team, boys sixteen years old and 
under, practiced two to three hours, three times each week at the 
Park and played one game each weekend, half at the Park.  He also 
coached a team for boys fourteen years of age and under.  That 
  
team also practiced three times each week and played a game once 
every weekend during the season.  Half of this team's games and 
practices were played at the Park. 
 Soccer's spring season started in April of each year 
and ended in early June.  Its fall season began in mid-August and 
ended in mid-November.  Practices were canceled if it rained, but 
games were played no matter what the weather conditions were.  If 
water was on the field, someone would shovel the water away or 
throw sawdust on it.  The soccer coach recalled several players 
falling into the drainage ditch that ran the length of the field, 
which was sometimes dry and sometimes wet.  Each practice started 
with calisthenics.   
 The record contains excerpts from the depositions of 
two of the soccer players.  One of them, a goalie, testified he 
often fell in the dirt around the goal area, sometimes face down 
in puddles one to two inches deep.  He also testified he 
sometimes got dirt in his mouth that he had to spit out.  Both 
players testified at times they went into the Creek to retrieve 
balls.  None of the players except Todd Elliott and his sister, 
Tracy Elliott are alleging that they are currently suffering from 
any ailment as a result of their exposure or that they have been 
personally advised by a doctor that they have an increased health 
risk due to their exposure. 
 
 E.  The Elliott Plaintiffs 
 The Elliott plaintiffs include soccer player Todd 
Elliott and his younger sister, Tracey Elliott, as well as their 
  
parents.  Todd played soccer at the Park and Tracey, while 
attending practices and games at the Park, skipped stones in a 
stagnant creek near the field, sat on the grass and ate food, 
crawled and ran on the field and walked through a mud-filled 
gully near the parking area.  The Elliotts allege that as a 
result of Todd's and Tracey's exposure to contaminants at the 
Park, Tracey is suffering from acute lymphocytic leukemia and 
Todd suffers from enlarged lymph nodes and an increased risk of 
cancer.5   
 
                     
5
.  The Elliotts are also plaintiffs in an action against the 
Three Mile Island nuclear plant and allege their illnesses were 
caused by its release of radiation in March of 1978.  See Brinser 
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., No. 481-S-88 (Pa. Commw. Ct. filed 
Feb. 1988). 
  
 F.  The Parties' Expert Reports6 
 1.  Plaintiffs' Risk Assessment 
 The plaintiffs rely primarily on a report by Richard S. 
Greeley, Ph.D. ("Dr. Greeley") of R.E. Wright Associates, Inc. 
entitled "Public Health Risk Assessment of a Soccer Field Near 
the New Cumberland Army Depot, Fairview Township," dated 
January 24, 1992 ("Plaintiffs' Risk Assessment").  The 
Plaintiffs' Risk Assessment is limited to a study of the health 
risks for children and adults making use of the former landfill 
as a soccer field.  It does not address any health risks to the 
Township Workers from their excavation work or to the Neighbors 
from their recreational use of the Creek and their ingestion of 
fish and animals from the Creek and Park or water from 
residential wells. 
 The Plaintiffs' Risk Assessment contains the following 
summary: 
 Surface soil samples and soil samples from 
excavation of test pits on the soccer field 
have shown that volatile and semi-volatile 
organic compounds and inorganic chemical 
compounds are present in the soil.  Some of 
these compounds are carcinogenic and others 
can cause adverse non-carcinogenic health 
effects.  The assessment considered health 
risks arising from four primary pathways of 
exposure of the soccer players, referees and 
                     
6
.  Because the parties on appeal do not dispute the 
admissability of any of the expert reports, we do not address the 
experts' qualifications or the reliability of their techniques or 
data, as otherwise required under our decisions In re Paoli 
Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 742-49 (3d Cir. 1994) 
("Paoli II"), cert. denied, General Electric Co. v. Ingram, 1995 
WL 75508 (Feb. 27, 1995), and In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB 
Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 855-859 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Paoli I"). 
  
coaches to contaminant chemicals in the soil: 
(1) ingestion of contaminated soil; (2) 
ingestion of contaminated water on or near 
the field; (3) inhalation of contaminated 
dust; and (4) dermal contact with the 
contaminated soil or water. 
 
 The risk assessment was conducted based on 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency risk 
assessment guidance documents. 
 
 The results of the calculations indicate that 
participation in games or practices at the 
soccer field for periods of time greater than 
33 hours results in significant health risks 
for both children and adults. 
 
 The primary chemicals contributing to these 
risks are the inorganic chemicals arsenic and 
lead, and the base neutral polycyclic 
aromatic hydrocarbon benzo(a)pyrene.  Other 
inorganic chemicals, polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons, and semi-volatile organic 
compounds contribute lesser percentages to 
the risks. 
 
 
App. at 2909a.  The Report also states that increased risk may 
arise from absorption of chemicals through a cut, abrasion or 
perspiration, increased amounts of volatiles and dusts in the air 
during play and ingestion of contaminated soil or water during 
rough play when a player's face comes in contact with the ground. 
 In arriving at his conclusion that adults and children 
using the field for soccer play or practice for more than 
thirty-three hours were exposed to a significant health risk, Dr. 
Greeley relied on EPA's risk assessment procedure which consists 
of four steps:  (1) data collection, evaluation and 
identification of chemicals of concern; (2) exposure assessment; 
(3) toxicity assessment and (4) risk characterization.  Risk 
  
characterization involves, among other things, the calculation of 
carcinogenic risks, which are stated in terms of "risk per 
million," and is arrived at by multiplying the calculated 
"increased risk of cancer" by 1,000,000.7  For each pathway of 
exposure, Dr. Greeley added together the cancer risks for each of 
the carcinogenic chemicals found at the site to derive an 
increased risk of cancer for each pathway.  He then totalled the 
risks for each pathway to arrive at a total "increased risk of 
cancer," which he defined as an increased risk of cancer due to 
exposure at the site against everyone's everyday risk of getting 
cancer.   
 Using the EPA guideline that treats an increased cancer 
risk which is greater than one in a million as "significant" and 
a similar guideline for non-carcinogenic health risks, Dr. 
Greeley concluded that children or adults playing or practicing 
soccer at the Park for thirty-three hours or more had an 
increased risk of cancer of one in a million and an increased 
                     
7
.  No one points to any demographic, epidemiologic or any other 
type of scientific data, nor to any risk-utility analysis that 
supports EPA's million-fold regulatory factor as demonstrating 
the presence of a hazard, nor does this threshold appear in the 
regulatory or statutory history.  Nevertheless, the million-fold 
factor seems ubiquitous in regulatory risk-utility determinations 
despite its indeterminate pedigree.  We will assume that it has 
some rational basis and thus represents a regulatory 
determination to which we must defer in deciding plaintiffs' 
statutory claims.  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 897 (1984); Federal Labor Relations 
Authority v. Dep't of Navy, 966 F.2d 747 (1992).  For purposes of 
simplicity, we will also use it to assess the tort claims.  We 
note, however, that a common law court may still be free to apply 
standard tort risk-utility analysis to the problem of defining 
the threshold at which a toxic substance becomes a hazard. 
  
risk of non-carcinogenic health problems of three in a million 
(children) and one in a million (adults).  Children who played or 
practiced soccer at the Park for the maximum calculated exposure 
time of 1,350 hours had an increased risk of cancer of sixty-five 
in a million and of non-carcinogenic health risks of thirty-eight 
in a million.  Adults with the maximum calculated exposure time 
had an increased risk of cancer of forty-six in a million and a 
non-carcinogenic increased health risk of eleven in a million.  
 In preparing his report, Dr. Greeley relied on the soil 
and groundwater sampling performed by Woodward-Clyde in March of 
1988.  Dr. Greeley also considered the soil and groundwater 
sampling results from the Corps' study performed in May of 1988 
and the EPA study performed in June of 1988, but he decided to 
rely solely on the Woodward-Clyde results because of "the non-
homogeneity of the landfill/soccer field soil, as well as the 
difficulty in attempting to correlate samples taken at different 
depths at different times by different sampling personnel."  App. 
at 2921a.  He reasoned that the Woodward-Clyde study was the most 
representative of the three, and its sampling was performed while 
the soccer field was still in use.  He acknowledged, however, 
that Woodward-Clyde only dug three test pits within the immediate 
area of the former landfill, now the soccer field, and that the 
samples were not from the surface but were "'near-surface'" 
samples and composite samples over the four-foot depth of the 
test pits.  Therefore, he concluded "[t]he actual concentrations 
of the chemicals of concern in the soil to which the soccer 
players and adults were exposed may vary more or less from the 
  
values selected for this risk assessment."  App. at 2960a.  He 
also considered and rejected additional exposure routes via 
ingestion or contact with the sediments in the marsh area 
adjacent to the soccer field and the surface water of the Creek 
because the concentrations of chemicals there were either below 
the detection limits of the testing method used or no larger than 
the concentrations in the test pit soils.  
  
 2.  Plaintiffs' Medical Monitoring Report 
 The plaintiffs also rely on a report by Susan M. Daum, 
M.D. ("Dr. Daum") entitled "Medical Surveillance for Individuals 
Exposed to Hazardous Waste on Land Known as 'Marsh Run Park' in 
Fairview, Pennsylvania near the 'New Cumberland Army Depot'" 
("Medical Monitoring Report") dated May 2, 1993.  App. at 3006a.  
There, Dr. Daum states she relies on Dr. Greeley's Risk 
Assessment and agrees with Dr. Greeley that risk levels above one 
times the background rate of one case per million is medically 
significant.  She refers to "the exposures which occurred from 
the . . . Depot and waste disposal site, whether through well 
water, or recreational activities on/in contaminated soil," as 
having a risk estimate above one in a million but does not state 
where she obtained the risk estimate for well water exposure, in 
light of the fact that Dr. Greeley did not address well-water 
exposure in his Risk Assessment.  App. at 3010a.  Ultimately, Dr. 
Daum concludes that 
 the examinations [she recommends] . . . are 
not out of the ordinary, but consist of the 
usual adult medical examinations recommended 
  
for all adults with the adult risk of cancer 
in our society from those carcinogen 
exposures which are already prevalent.  It is 
because of the increased risk of the 
exposures at the Marsh Run area, however, 
that such examinations become more urgent, 
and access to such examinations should not be 
left to vicissitudes of employment, health 
insurance contract, or other individual 
economic difficulties so prevalent in current 
health care delivery. 
 
 
App. at 3008a.  Therefore, Dr. Daum did not recommend any 
specialized tests for any of the plaintiffs but did recommend 
routine physical examinations and preventative programs. 
 
 3.  Plaintiffs' Contributing Contaminants Report 
 Finally, the plaintiffs rely on a report by Richard C. 
Cronce, Ph.D. ("Dr. Cronce") of R.E. Wright Associates, Inc. 
entitled "Evaluation Contributions of Contaminants to the 
Fairview Township Soccer Field" ("Contributing Contaminants 
Report") dated May 19, 1993.  App. at 3044.  The purpose of the 
report is "to determine the possible pathways of migration of 
regulated compounds to the surface of the soccer field, thus 
exposing persons on the field to potential adverse health effects 
from these chemicals."  Id. at 3044a.  In preparing his report, 
Dr. Cronce reviewed the various Army reports on the site and also 
performed a "site walkover" to observe present on-site 
conditions.  Id. at 3044.  The report concludes that periodic 
additions of contaminants to the surface of the soccer field are 
likely as a result of flooding, overland flow of discharge waters 
from a drainage pipe adjacent to the field, erosion of top soil 
  
which is revealing an underlying layer of coal ash and movement 
of the contaminants inside the landfill up to the surface soil 
either by VOCs moving up through pore space in the soil or semi-
volatile organic compounds moving upwards as a result of 
pedoturbation, or physical soil mixing, which occurs as animals 
or insects dig or burrow in the ground.  Finally, Dr. Cronce 
concluded that because some of the topsoil used on the field 
originated from a point along the Creek, it was probably 
contaminated. 
 Dr. Cronce did not perform any soil testing to confirm 
his hypotheses.  He believed, however, that "[t]he presence of 
these contaminants on the existing surface has been documented 
and, therefore, the contribution of these contaminants from these 
various processes is highly likely."  Id. at 3049a. 
 
 4.  Elliott Plaintiffs' Expert Report 
 Finally, the record contains the affidavit of Peter W. 
Wright, M.D. ("Dr. Wright"), dated April 23, 1992 regarding 
plaintiff Tracy Elliott's acute lymphocytic leukemia and 
plaintiff Todd Elliott's enlarged lymph nodes.  While preparing 
his report, Dr. Wright reviewed Tracy and Todd Elliotts' medical 
records as well as extensive scientific and medical literature 
regarding the causes of cancer and acute leukemias in particular.  
He concluded, "based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
[that] the chemicals . . . found at Marsh Run Park are known to 
cause cancer, and some have been specifically implicated with 
acute leukemias, such as that which has affected Tracy Elliott. 
  
App. at 2233a-34a. Dr. Wright further opined that "the acute 
lymphocytic leukemia of Tracey Elliott is related to her exposure 
to the [certain] chemicals[]" [and that] "Todd Elliott, . . . due 
to his exposure to the [these] chemicals, is himself at increased 
risk of cancer."  Id. 
 
 5.  Defendants' Expert Reports 
 The defendants present a number of expert reports 
refuting plaintiffs' experts' conclusions and assumptions.  
Jessica Herzstein, M.D., M.P.H. ("Dr. Herzstein"), a physician 
specializing in occupational and environmental health, reviewed 
the Plaintiffs' Risk Assessment and the three soil sample 
analyses performed in 1987 and 1988.  She concluded that no 
medical monitoring was necessary because the plaintiffs' excess 
risk for cancer was extremely low and the risks of such tests 
outweighed the benefits.  Dr. Herzstein also produced an 
affidavit addressing Dr. Daum's Medical Monitoring Report and 
refuting its conclusion that medical monitoring was necessary for 
the same reasons given in her initial report.   Defendants also 
produced an expert report by Martyn T. Smith, Ph.D. ("Dr. 
Smith"), a toxicology specialist, who also critiqued Plaintiffs' 
Risk Assessment and concluded that the actual excess cancer risk 
posed to the Soccer Plaintiffs was zero.  Dr. Smith also 
concluded that Plaintiffs' Risk Assessment was flawed in the 
following respects: (1) it utilized unrealistic weather 
conditions; (2) it assumed an exceptionally high intake of 
surface water and soil; (3) it used test results from soil 
  
samples taken three to five feet below the surface; (4) it failed 
to take into account normal background levels of contaminants and 
(5) it used rodent studies for carcinogenic potency values, which 
are upper bound estimates of human potencies.  Dr. Smith also 
produced an affidavit negating Dr. Greeley's response to his 
critique of the Plaintiffs' Risk Assessment. 
 James H. Jandl, M.D. ("Dr. Jandl"), a specialist in 
blood and blood disorders, reviewed Tracey Elliott's medical 
records as well as the existing literature and research in the 
fields of hematology and oncology and concluded that there is no 
medically recognized evidence linking acute lymphatic 
(lymphoblastic) leukemia to any chemical substances.  He stated 
that the only known cause of this type of leukemia is exposure to 
ionizing radiation.  He also reviewed Todd Elliott's medical 
records and concluded Todd has no medical problem with respect to 
his enlarged lymph nodes. 
 Roger Minear ("Minear"), Director of the Institute for 
Environmental Studies at the University of Illinois and Professor 
of Civil Engineering, conducted a detailed review of the 
available documents concerning the Army's use of the land as a 
landfill as well as the various soil studies and remedial 
investigations reports undertaken by EPA and the Army and 
pertinent literature.  He concluded that the landfill has not 
caused surface contamination at the soccer field and that 
plaintiffs' use of the subsurface soil test results to represent 
the surface conditions on the soccer field was not realistic or 
scientifically defensible.  He also prepared a report critiquing 
  
Dr. Cronce's Contributing Contaminants Report, concluding that 
Dr. Cronce's hypothesized transportations of contaminants to the 
field has not been confirmed by any of the soil samples. 
 Finally, defendants rely on a report by Marilyn A. 
Hewitt, P.G. ("Hewitt"), a certified professional geologist and 
former Pennsylvania DER hydrogeologist.  Hewitt reviewed 
Plaintiffs' Risk Assessment, as well as the soil test reports and 
other environmental investigation reports at the Park, maps, 
photographs, depositions and correspondence.  She concluded that 
the exposure assumptions made in the Plaintiffs' Risk Assessment 
were not consistent with standard EPA protocols for evaluating 
human exposure to contaminants when the use of the contaminated 
property is recreational, such as a soccer field.  She found the 
Plaintiffs' Risk Assessment was erroneous primarily because it 
utilized test results from soils as deep as three feet below the 
surface, whereas the standard EPA protocol called for use of 
surface soil samples no more than one foot deep.  She also found 
the Risk Assessment failed to average the concentrations of 
contaminants in the soil samples and calculated the health risks 
using the maximum concentrations of contaminants, also contrary 
to standard EPA protocol.  Therefore, she concluded that the 
Plaintiffs' Risk Assessment contained an inflated estimate of the 
health risks associated with the soccer field.  She also examined 
Dr. Cronce's Contributing Contaminants Report and, using the 
available soil testing results, refuted Dr. Cronce's assumptions 
regarding contaminants being contributed from other contaminated 
areas of the Creek or Depot.  She refuted Dr. Cronce's conclusion 
  
that the surface soils were contaminated by upward transport by 
volitization of contaminants within the landfill based on the 
"insignificant" concentrations of such chemicals in the soils at 
the Park.  App. at 3223a.  Finally, Hewitt refuted Dr. Cronce's 
assumption that pedoturbation had caused mixing of the surface 
soils with the contaminated subsurface soils based on the fact 
that the surface soils were tested after the field had been 
closed for use as a soccer field. 
 Both Dr. Greeley and Dr. Cronce submitted affidavits 
responding to defendants' experts' critiques of their reports.   
 
 II.  Procedural History 
 On June 7, 1990, five of the plaintiffs filed a class 
action complaint ("Redland complaint") seeking (1) injunctive 
relief and money damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2671 et seq. (West 1994), for remedial 
action, medical monitoring and emotional distress ("Redland FTCA 
Plaintiffs"); (2) injunctive relief and response costs under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq. (West Supp. 1994), in 
the form of remedial action, medical monitoring and reimbursement 
of plaintiffs' litigation costs; (3) injunctive relief under the 
Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act ("HSCA"), 35 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 6020.101 et seq. (West 1993), in the form of remedial 
action, monetary damages and reimbursement of plaintiffs' 
litigation costs and (4) monetary damages for diminution of the 
Neighbors' property values based on trespass.  On February 26, 
  
1991, the Elliotts filed a complaint under the FTCA alleging 
negligence and seeking monetary damages for past and future 
medical expenses, pain and suffering, medical monitoring and 
litigation costs.  The district court consolidated these cases on 
September 30, 1993. 
 The district court denied class certification for the 
Soccer Plaintiffs, Neighbors and Township Workers on March 4, 
1991.  After the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was 
denied on May 3, 1991, they filed an amended complaint joining an 
additional one hundred forty-five plaintiffs (collectively 
"Redland Plaintiffs") on August 26, 1991. 
 On December 12, 1991, the United States moved to 
dismiss plaintiffs' claims for medical monitoring and injunctive 
relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  On 
February 12, 1992, the district court granted the motion in part, 
and dismissed the Redland Plaintiffs' request for a medical 
monitoring fund under CERCLA.  The court also dismissed all of 
the Redland Plaintiffs' FTCA claims requesting injunctive relief.  
 On March 27, 1992, the United States moved for 
dismissal of the Elliotts' complaint and for summary judgment.  
On June 23, 1992, the district court granted the motion in part 
and entered summary judgment in favor of the United States on all 
claims except medical monitoring, which it then left for trial.  
 On June 4, 1992, the United States moved for summary 
judgment or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment on the 
amended Redland complaint.  On September 15, 1992, the district 
court granted the motion in part and dismissed the Redland 
  
plaintiffs' citizen suits under CERCLA and HSCA claims for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  The court also granted summary 
judgment to the United States and dismissed the Redland 
Plaintiffs' claims for attorneys' fees and experts' fees under 
CERCLA and for attorneys' fees under the HSCA.  The court did not 
address the Redland Plaintiffs' entitlement to expert fees under 
HSCA.  The court denied the United States' request for partial 
summary judgment based on sovereign immunity, and denied the 
motion in all other respects.   
 On January 25, 1993, the United States moved to dismiss 
the Redland Plaintiffs' FTCA claims for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and, in a separate motion, asked for summary 
judgment on all of the plaintiffs' claims for medical monitoring 
and emotional distress, including the Elliotts' medical 
monitoring claim.  On June 1, 1993, all plaintiffs moved for 
partial summary judgment.  On October 19, 1993, the district 
court denied the United States' motion to dismiss but granted its 
motion for summary judgment on all plaintiffs' medical monitoring 
and emotional distress claims and entered judgment against 
plaintiffs on those claims.  It therefore denied plaintiffs' 
motion for partial summary judgment.   
 During the proceedings in the district court, the 
parties became embroiled in a number of discovery disputes which 
the district court resolved in the United States' favor and which 
plaintiffs now challenge on appeal.  These include (1) an order 
dated January 14, 1991 denying plaintiffs' motion to compel 
discovery and sustaining the United States' objections to several  
  
interrogatories; (2) an order dated August 13, 1992 denying 
plaintiffs' motion to compel the production of one hundred 
thirty-nine documents and sustaining the United States' assertion 
of the Deliberative Process Privilege; (3) an order dated 
January 29, 1993 denying plaintiffs' motion to compel the 
production of five documents and sustaining the United States' 
assertion of the Deliberative Process Privilege; (4) an order 
dated March 4, 1993 granting the United States' motion for a 
protective order concerning plaintiffs' notices of deposition and 
(5) an order dated November 16, 1993 denying plaintiffs' motion 
for emergency relief concerning defense counsel's contact with 
former Army employees who were potential witnesses for the 
plaintiffs. 
 On November 29, 1993, the court entered final judgment 
in favor of the United States and against the plaintiffs.  On 
December 23, 1993 plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
  
 III.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1346 (West 1993) and 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2671 (West 1994), as well as CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b) 
(West 1983).  It had supplemental jurisdiction over the 
plaintiffs' state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West 
1993).  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1291 (West 1993). 
 In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we 
exercise plenary review.  Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, we look to see if there was a 
genuine issue of material fact; and, if not, whether the moving 
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 
(1986); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 860 
(3d Cir. 1990) ("Paoli I").    
 We review de novo the district court's determination 
that the Redland Plaintiffs were not entitled to response costs 
under CERCLA and HSCA, including a health risk assessment, expert 
fees, attorney fees and other costs.  See United States v. 
Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1446 (10th Cir. 1992).  Finally, we 
generally review the court's discovery rulings for abuse of 
discretion.  See Marroquin Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984).  
Nevertheless, we exercise de novo review over the standards the 
district court used in exercising its discretion.  We find an 
abuse of discretion only if there is either an interference with 
  
a substantial right or a gross abuse that could result in 
fundamental unfairness at trial.  Id. (citations omitted).  
 
 IV.  Plaintiffs' Claims Under FTCA 
 A.  Medical Monitoring 
 We will first address the Redland FTCA Plaintiffs' 
argument that they presented sufficient evidence to the district 
court to withstand a motion for summary judgment on their FTCA 
claim that the Army's negligence entitles them to medical 
monitoring.  In Paoli I, supra, we concluded that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would recognize a cause of action for 
medical monitoring for plaintiffs who have been exposed to 
various toxic substances.  See Paoli I, 916 F.2d at 852.  In so 
concluding, we set forth four factors a plaintiff must prove in 
order to recover: 
  1. Plaintiff was significantly exposed 
to a proven hazardous substance through the 
negligent actions of the defendant. 
 
  2. As a proximate result of exposure, 
plaintiff suffers a significantly increased 
risk of contracting a serious latent disease. 
 
  3. That increased risk makes periodic 
examinations reasonably necessary. 
  
  4. Monitoring and testing procedures 
exist which make the early detection and 
treatment of the disease possible and 
beneficial. 
 
 
Id.  We stated that these factors must be proven by competent 
expert testimony.  Id. (citation omitted).  We did not, however, 
  
define the term "significantly exposed" or state what details an 
expert must testify to in order to establish it. 
 We recently revisited this issue in In re Paoli 
Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994), 
(Paoli II), cert. denied, General Electric Co. v. Ingram, 1995 WL 
75508 (Feb. 27, 1995) .  There, we noted a New Jersey Supreme 
Court decision which held that plaintiffs seeking recovery for 
medical monitoring must "'have . . . experienced direct and hence 
discrete exposure to a toxic substance[.]'"  Id. at 787 (quoting 
Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993)).  Theer 
held a plaintiff who was exposed to asbestos while laundering her 
husband's clothes could not bring a medical monitoring claim 
because, in part, "it was too difficult to quantify her 
exposure."  Id.  We noted our uncertainty regarding the impact of 
Theer, but believed Pennsylvania courts would not adopt such a 
narrow view of the cause of action.  We reasoned that "[s]omeone 
indirectly exposed to one chemical might have as much risk of 
disease as someone directly exposed to another chemical[.]"  Id. 
at 787-88.  Accordingly, we declined to adopt a "per se rule 
requiring direct exposure, actual injury, and testimony about an 
individual's particular level of exposure."  Id. at 788. 
 Nevertheless, we predicted that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would set some limits on a medical monitoring 
claim, and we therefore adopted the Utah Supreme Court's holding 
in Hansen v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 858 P.2d 970, 980 (Utah 1993).  
We stated that: 
  
 In order for a plaintiff to show significant 
exposure that causes a significantly 
increased risk to plaintiff of contracting a 
serious disease that makes periodic testing 
reasonably necessary, we think that a 
plaintiff must: 
 
  prove that by reason of the 
exposure to the toxic substance 
caused by the defendant's 
negligence, a reasonable physician 
would prescribe for her or him a 
monitoring regime different from 
the one that would have been 
prescribed in the absence of that 
particular exposure.  This is 
because under this cause of action, 
a plaintiff may recover only if the 
defendant's wrongful acts increased 
the plaintiff's incremental risk of 
incurring the harm produced by the 
toxic substance enough to warrant  
a change in the medical monitoring 
that otherwise would be prescribed 
for that plaintiff. 
 
 Hansen v. CCI Mech., Inc., 858 P.2d 970, 980 
(Utah 1993).  The court continued: 
 
  [I]f a reasonable physician would 
not prescribe it for a particular 
plaintiff because the benefits of 
the monitoring would be outweighed 
by the costs, which may include, 
among other things, the burdensome 
frequency of the monitoring 
procedure, its excessive price, or 
its risk of harm to the patient, 
then recovery would not be allowed. 
 
 
Id. at 788.  "Significant exposure," therefore, refers to an 
exposure which, either by duration or harm, is sufficient to 
cause a significantly increased risk, which in turn is sufficient 
to require a monitoring regime different from that normally 
required in the absence of such an exposure. 
  
 Here, in order to establish the first Paoli I factor of 
significant exposure, the district court reasoned that plaintiffs 
must show by clear evidence that they were actually exposed to 
toxins.  The district court noted that "[t]here is, of necessity, 
a degree of speculation in a medical monitoring case.  
However, . . . the allowable conjecture should be in regard to 
the amount or future effect of the exposure, not whether there 
was exposure at all."  Redland Soccer Club Inc. v. Dep't of Navy, 
No. 90-1072, slip op. at 14-15 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 1993).  After 
reviewing plaintiffs' expert reports, the district court 
concluded that nowhere did plaintiffs' experts unequivocally 
state that plaintiffs had actually been exposed to any of the 
toxins alleged to be in the Park's soils or that any of the 
toxins had actually entered any of the plaintiffs' bodies.  The 
district court's conclusion was based on plaintiffs' failure to 
present any evidence that the surface soils of the Park contained 
a level of contamination harmful to human beings. 
 The district court's analysis focuses perceptively on 
an issue we believe is central in all toxic tort cases; namely, 
the requirement that the alleged wrong create some significant 
risk of harm to the plaintiff.  Thus, a plaintiff must not only 
show exposure, but must prove that he was exposed beyond what 
would normally be encountered by a person in everyday life, so 
that the plaintiff's risk of being injured from the exposure is 
greater, in some way, than the normal risks all of us encounter 
in our everyday lives.  In Paoli II, we chose not to delve into 
the issues of how much exposure there had to be to equal 
  
"significant exposure", nor how "direct" the exposure must be.  
Instead, we simply required the plaintiff to prove indirectly the 
nature of the exposure by requiring him to show an "injury" 
(e.g., a need for medical monitoring greater than that what is 
required by all persons).8   
 We do not believe, however, that the Redland FTCA 
Plaintiffs' failure to produce evidence, in the form of blood or 
tissue tests, showing directly that they absorbed toxins from the 
field into their bodies is fatal to their claims.  Defendants' 
own expert stated generally that there are no medical tests which 
                     
8
.  The injury requirement is particularly important before a 
remedy such as medical monitoring is provided because the 
plaintiff's injury is only an increased possibility of harm 
rather than actual harm.  Paoli II's requirement of "special" 
medical monitoring implicitly recognizes the longstanding 
requirement in all tort cases other than those based on the old 
"intentional" common law torts for various forms of trespass that 
a plaintiff must prove an injury before he may recover anything 
from a defendant. See Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 
F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir. 1985) ("An actionable tort, whether 
based on negligence or strict liability consists of two elements:  
a failure to act in accordance with the standard of care required 
by law and a resultant injury . . . .  However egregious the 
legal fault, there is no cause of action for negligence . . . 
until there is 'actual loss or damage resulting to the interests 
of another.'") (citations omitted).  Otherwise, a polluter would 
become a health care insurer for medical procedures routinely 
needed to guard persons against some of the ordinary vicissitudes 
of life.  It would convert toxic torts into a form of specialized 
health insurance.  Imposition of liability on this basis seems to 
go beyond current tort theories of negligence or strict liability 
by requiring a polluter to pay for medical procedures that the 
general population should receive.  Thus, Paoli II requires 
plaintiffs to show not only that their exposure to toxic 
substances is greater than normal background levels, but that the 
increased risk of injury from such exposure warrants medical 
monitoring against future illness beyond that which is 
recommended for everyone.  See Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 788. 
  
could have detected the presence of the toxins found at the Park, 
and even if a test existed which could have detected a particular 
toxin, it would have been useful only if it were conducted within 
one hundred twenty days of the plaintiffs' exposure.  App. at 
82a.  Requiring a plaintiff to produce this kind of evidence to 
support a finding of exposure to a toxic hazard would place an 
impossible burden on persons subjected to serious medical risk 
from toxic substances polluters have left to contaminate the 
environment and afflict the people who live near the wrongdoer's 
waste deposits.  Thus, even without this direct evidence, we 
believe plaintiffs may still satisfy the first Paoli I factor 
through expert testimony showing they were exposed to the toxins 
at issue at levels significantly above their normal background 
presence so as to require special tests or more frequent medical 
monitoring than medicine recommends for the general population.  
With this in mind, we turn to the Redland FTCA Plaintiffs' expert 
reports to see whether any of them have produced evidence 
sufficient to survive summary judgment on their medical 
monitoring claims. 
 Surprisingly, we discover the record has no expert 
opinion on whether either the Township Workers or the Neighbors 
have been exposed to toxins to such an extent that they suffer 
such an increased risk of contracting a serious disease that 
supplemental medical testing is reasonably required.  Of all the 
Redland Plaintiffs, the Township Workers who excavated and 
levelled the contaminated landfill for four months would appear 
to have the highest potential for significant exposure to toxins. 
  
Yet plaintiffs' experts virtually ignore them, as well as the 
Neighbors, and focus their expert opinion almost exclusively on 
the soccer players, who would seem to have suffered a more 
limited risk of significant exposure, given the paucity of 
evidence in this record showing there were harmful quantities of 
contaminants in the surface soils of the playing field.  Our 
review of the expert reports presented by the parties, as well as 
the soil testing analyses, indicates that the subsurface of the 
landfill was contaminated; but neither the EPA's nor the Corps' 
surface soil test results indicate contamination in the surface 
soil above background levels.  It is undisputed that the soccer 
players' primary exposure for any substantial length of time was 
only to the surface soils on the soccer field.  Without evidence 
showing that the surface was contaminated, the Soccer Plaintiffs 
cannot show significant exposure. 
 Dr. Greeley's report relies solely on the 
Woodward-Clyde soil samples which were taken at some depth below 
the surface of the Park, and he acknowledges that the exposure 
values selected for use in the risk assessment may vary from the 
actual concentrations in the soil.  Nevertheless, we believe that 
Dr. Greeley's report, as well as Dr. Cronce's report in which he 
concluded that contaminants from the subsurface could migrate 
upwards into the surface and that flooding of the Creek could 
spread contaminants on the surface, permit a reasonable 
factfinder to infer that adults and children using the soccer 
field for thirty-three hours or more were exposed to carcinogens 
and non-carcinogens that increased their risk of illness beyond 
  
the one-in-a-million benchmark the EPA uses to measure 
significant risk.9 
 Turning to the Redland FTCA Plaintiffs' evidence 
concerning special medical monitoring, the only expert report 
concerning the need for and extent of medical monitoring is that 
of Dr. Daum.  She expressly states that she does not recommend 
special testing for any of the plaintiffs:10 
 I emphasize . . . that the examinations 
suggested [below] are not out of the 
ordinary, but consist of the usual adult 
medical examinations recommended for all 
adults with the adult risk of cancer in our 
society . . . .  It is because of the 
increased risk of the exposures at the Marsh 
Run area, however, that such examinations 
become more urgent, and access to such 
examinations should not be limited to 
vicissitudes of employment, health insurance 
contract, or other individual economic 
difficulties . . . . 
 
 
She acknowledges the considerable limitations of the currently 
known examinations and tests for the early detection of cancer, 
as well as the fact that some, such as lung cancer screening, 
create risks that outweigh the potential benefits.  She also 
                     
9
.  We again note, however, that Dr. Cronce's report is not based 
on any study quantifying the actual effects of this hypothetical 
migration.  We also note again that EPA's basis for its use of 
the one-in-a-million lifetime ratio to judge significant exposure 
is not readily apparent.  Nevertheless, we will assume a rational 
basis for EPA's one-in-a-million standard in defining 
"significant" risk.  See supra footnote 7. 
10
.  Dr. Daum does not distinguish between the different groups 
of Redland Plaintiffs.  Rather, she refers simply to them as the 
"individuals" exposed to contaminants at the Park.  App. at 
3006a. 
  
declines to recommend any specific surveillance tests for any 
other non-cancerous chronic diseases, for the same reasons.  
(App. 3011) 
 Thus, because all the Redland FTCA Plaintiffs (the 
Township Workers, the Neighbors and the Soccer Players) failed to 
introduce evidence that their exposure required a different 
medical monitoring regimen than that which would normally be 
recommended for them absent exposure, under Paoli II, we will 
affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment to 
the United States on the Redland FTCA Plaintiffs' medical 
monitoring claims. 
 
 B.  Emotional Distress 
 The Redland FTCA Plaintiffs also seek to recover 
damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by 
their exposure to chemicals at the Park.  The record shows that 
none of the Redland FTCA Plaintiffs currently suffer a physical 
injury or a medically-identifiable effect from any exposure to 
chemicals at the Park.  Therefore, we conclude the district court 
did not err in granting summary judgment to the United States on 
this aspect of plaintiffs' claim.  Absent some physical injury or 
impact, Pennsylvania's governing law does not provide recovery 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  See Wisniewski 
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 274 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing 
Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493, 508 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1984)); see also Bubash v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 717 
  
F. Supp. 297, 300 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (mere exposure not equivalent 
to physical injury). 
 We also believe the district court correctly 
distinguished Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847 
(M.D. Pa. 1988).  There, the court held that plaintiffs' 
emotional distress claims survived Westinghouse's summary 
judgment motion because the plaintiffs' experts testified that 
plaintiffs suffered a present "physical effect as a result" of 
exposure to contaminated well water and that some plaintiffs 
"demonstrated acute physical symptoms of exposure to the 
chemicals."  Id. at 852.  We have no such expert evidence here.  
Therefore, summary judgment against the Redland FTCA Plaintiffs 
on their emotional distress claims was appropriate.11 
 
 V.  The Redland Plaintiffs' Claims Under CERCLA 
 We turn next to the Redland Plaintiffs' argument that 
the district court erred in dismissing their claims for response 
costs, including attorneys fees, expert witness fees and health 
                     
11
.  The Redland FTCA Plaintiffs also argue the district court 
erred in dismissing their FTCA request for remedial action under 
CERCLA and HSCA.  This remedy is not available against the United 
States under FTCA, and we will affirm the district court's order 
dismissing it.  See, e.g., Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 
177, 182 (1956) (district court did not possess power under FTCA 
to enjoin United States); Moon v. Takisaki, 501 F.2d 389, 390 
(9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (FTCA does not submit United States 
to injunctive relief).  Accordingly, we need not, and do not 
consider whether the district court correctly denied the Redland 
FTCA Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their claim of 
negligence per se against the United States. 
  
risk assessment costs, under CERCLA.  We conclude that the 
district court correctly dismissed these response cost claims.12 
 Although the Redland Plaintiffs acknowledge the 
existence of an ongoing remedial action at the site, they contend 
that the remedial action "is not even attempting to address the 
health risks created by the contaminated site," and therefore 
their request for expert fees, costs of health risk assessments 
and other costs are not "challenges" to the remedial action.  
Brief for Appellants at 17.  They also contend their action is an 
action for response costs, which is not subject to CERCLA's 
prohibition against private remedial actions.  See 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 9613(h) (West Supp. 1994). 
 Under CERCLA, there are at least two theories on which 
a private individual can base an action for response cost.  
First, a person who has incurred response costs that were 
necessary and consistent with the national contingency plan 
                     
12
.  Initially, we note that the Redland plaintiffs also contend 
that the district court erred in dismissing their claim for 
medical monitoring under CERCLA.  We believe that the elements of 
a claim for medical monitoring under CERCLA and HSCA are the same 
as the elements for a common law medical monitoring claim set out 
in Paoli I and Paoli II.  Because of our conclusion that the 
Redland FTCA Plaintiffs failed to introduce sufficient evidence 
to survive a summary judgment motion on their FTCA medical 
monitoring claim, we need not and do not address whether they 
could recover medical monitoring costs from the United States as 
a "response cost" under CERCLA or HSCA.  We also note that the 
United States Supreme Court recently held  that attorneys fees 
are not recoverable as response costs under CERCLA.  See Key 
Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1967 (1994).  
Thus, as the Redland Plaintiffs concede, we must affirm the 
district court's order dismissing their request for attorneys 
fees under CERCLA. 
  
("NCP"), has a private right of action under 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1994).  Second, any person may bring 
a civil action on his own behalf in the proper district court 
against any person, including the United States or its agencies, 
for violations of CERCLA or against the President or the 
Administrator of EPA for their failure to perform any act or duty 
arising under CERCLA.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659(a) (West Supp. 
1994); see also Key Tronic Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 1965-66. 
 The district court's jurisdiction over such actions is 
limited as follows: 
  No Federal Court shall have jurisdiction 
under Federal law other than under section 
1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction) or under [relevant] 
State law . . . to review any challenges to 
removal or remedial action selected under 
section 9604 of this title, or to review any 
order issued under section 9606(a) of this 
title, in any action except one of the 
following: 
 
  (1) An action under section 9607 of 
this title to recover response costs or 
damages or for contribution. 
 
 . . . 
 
   (4) An action under section 
9659 of this title (relating to 
citizen suits) alleging that the 
removal or remedial action taken 
under section 9604 of this title or 
secured under section 9606 of this 
title was in violation of any 
requirement of this chapter.  Such 
an action may not be brought with 
regard to a removal where a 
remedial action is to be undertaken 
at the site. 
 
 
  
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(h)(1), (4) (West Supp. 1994).13 
 The absence of a definition of "response costs" has 
been the source of much litigation since CERCLA's enactment.  The 
terms "response" and "respond" are defined as "remove, removal, 
remedy, and remedial action," including enforcement activities.  
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(25) (West Supp. 1994).  "'[R]emedial action' 
means those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken 
instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a 
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the 
environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous 
substances . . . ."  42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(24) (West Supp. 1994) (in 
relevant part).  The terms "remove" or "removal" means: 
 the cleanup or removal of released hazardous 
substances from the environment, such actions 
as may be necessary taken in the event of the 
threat of release of hazardous substances 
into the environment, such actions as may be 
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate 
the release or threat of release of hazardous 
substances, the disposal of removed material, 
or the taking of such other actions as may be 
necessary to prevent, minimize or mitigate 
damage to the public health or welfare or to 
the environment, which may otherwise result 
from a release or threat of release. 
 
 
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23) (in relevant part). 
                     
13
.  The Redland Plaintiffs argue the district court incorrectly 
limited its analysis to section 9613(h)(1), (4) in dismissing 
their CERCLA claims.  Nevertheless, when we look to section 9659, 
we see that the issues still to be decided on this appeal do not 
involve either of the kinds of claims that can support a 
citizen's suit alleging a removal or remedial action undertaken 
or secured by or through EPA.  The Redland Plaintiffs do not 
contend otherwise.  Therefore, we focus our analysis on the first 
exception to section 9613(h). 
  
 We do not believe the Redland Plaintiffs' litigation 
costs are "response costs" under any of these definitions.  The 
health risk assessment and expert testimony were designed to 
assess, for litigation purposes, what health risks, if any, the 
plaintiffs were exposed to while using the Park for recreation.  
The expert assessments were conducted long after the Park was 
closed to recreational use and have nothing to do with any 
remedial or response action at the Park itself.  Moreover, under 
section 9607, plaintiffs may only recover response costs which 
are necessary and consistent with the NCP.  See 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 9607(a)(4)(B).  The heart of these definitions of removal and 
remedy are "'directed at containing and cleaning up hazardous 
releases. . . .  [T]herefore[,] . . . 'necessary costs of 
response' must be necessary to the containment and cleanup of 
hazardous releases."  United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 
1448 (10th Cir. 1992) (health assessments conducted by experts    
retained for litigation purposes not response costs under section 
9607(a)(4)(B)), cert. denied, Advance Chemical Co. v. U.S., 114 
S. Ct. 300 (1993); see Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 
1468, 1476 (D. Colo. 1991) ("A plaintiff who has incurred no 
costs, except for litigation expenses, prior to the filing of a 
CERCLA action has incurred no 'necessary costs of response' under 
§ 9607(a)."); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1246 
(M.D. Pa. 1991) (health assessments not recoverable response 
costs under CERCLA).  Therefore, we do not believe the district 
court erred in determining that plaintiffs' costs are not 
response costs because they are not "monies . . . expended to 
  
clean up sites or to prevent further releases of hazardous 
chemicals."  Redland Soccer Club Inc. v. Dep't of Navy, No. 90-
1073, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15,, 1992).14 
 
 VI.  Summary Judgment against Elliotts 
 Finally, we consider the Elliotts' claims.  They 
challenge the district court orders dismissing their FTCA 
negligence claim against the Army in which they seek damages for 
medical monitoring, past and future medical expenses, pain and 
suffering and emotional distress.  The district court held that 
the Elliotts, like the other plaintiffs, had produced no evidence 
they were actually exposed to chemicals at the Park.  We 
concluded in Section IV.A. that there is enough evidence to 
create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether persons 
using the Park for thirty-three hours or more had enough exposure 
to carcinogens and non-carcinogenic toxins to create a 
significant risk to their health.  Nevertheless, we affirmed the 
district court's order granting summary judgment to the 
government on the claims of the Township Workers, the soccer 
players and the Neighbors for medical monitoring because they had 
failed to show that their exposure made any medical monitoring 
                     
14
.  The Redland Plaintiffs also argue that the district court 
erred in dismissing their citizen suits for injunctive and 
remedial relief, as well as attorneys fees, expert fees and 
health risk assessment costs under HSCA.  In view of our 
disposition, we need not decide that issue.  We note, however, 
that the test of HSCA is markedly different from that of CERCLA.  
We express no opinion, however, about any claim for medical 
monitoring under state law. 
  
tests or examinations necessary or desirable other than those 
that health care professionals recommend for people who have had 
no exposure to any of the toxic substances that might be found at 
the Park. 
 The Elliotts' case differs in a striking respect from 
the other plaintiffs in this action:  Tracey Elliott suffers from 
leukemia and Todd Elliott suffers from enlarged lymph nodes.  
None of the other Redland Plaintiffs show any signs of physical 
injury from their exposure.  Accordingly, the Elliotts have shown 
harm because the illnesses of their children demonstrate an 
immediate need for medical monitoring beyond that which is 
recommended for the general population.  Still, neither their 
common law tort claim nor any of their statutory claims can 
survive unless they establish their exposure is the cause of 
their increased medical needs.  The district court held that Dr. 
Wright's statement that the Elliott children's illnesses were 
"related to" their exposure to the health hazards at the Park 
that resulted from the Army's deposit of toxic substances there 
was insufficient to show causation under applicable Pennsylvania 
law.  We believe the conclusion that the Elliotts have failed to 
show causation, as a matter of law, should not have been made at 
this stage of the proceeding on the record before the district 
court. 
 In order to establish a traditional tort claim for 
negligence under Pennsylvania law, the Elliotts must establish 
that the Army's failure to exercise reasonable care towards them 
and any breach of its duty exposed them to an elevated risk of 
  
foreseeable harm, which resulted in injury.15  Mohler v. Jeke, 
595 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).  On this record, we think 
the question whether the Elliotts can successfully establish all 
these elements of their claim is a question of fact, not law.  At 
this stage, we look only to see if the Elliotts have introduced 
enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 
each of these elements, including causation, the only one still 
at issue.  For the following reasons, we conclude they have. 
 We note initially that "cause in fact," or physical 
cause, is not the same as "proximate cause," or legal cause, and 
that both must be shown.  See Bell v. Irace, 619 A.2d 365, 367 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Novak v. Jeanette Dist. Mem. Hosp., 600 
A.2d 616, 618 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).  Causation in fact is 
normally a question for the jury, but proximate cause poses 
questions of law which require the court to determine whether the 
defendant's negligence was so remote that, as a matter of law, he 
cannot be held liable for the harm which subsequently occurred.  
See Bell, 619 A.2d at 367; Novak 600 A.2d at 618.  Of course, 
under Pennsylvania law, the exposure must appear to contribute 
                     
15
.  The parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs all state 
law issues in this case.  We believe causation is an issue that 
should be determined by state law on all the theories of recovery 
the Elliotts assert.  Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 717.  Like the 
district court, we recognize that violation of a statute or 
administrative regulation may be negligence per se, and therefore 
a higher degree of care may be required in handling dangerous or 
toxic materials.  The principles of negligence per se aid 
plaintiffs in establishing a breach of duty, but they do not 
avoid the issue of causation.  The basic elements of any 
negligence claim remain a duty, breach of the duty, actual loss 
or harm and a causal connection between the breach and the harm.  
See Casey v. Geiger, 499 A.2d 606, 612 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
  
"substantially" to the Elliotts' injuries, but this is an issue 
of degree that is usually a question for the factfinder.16  See 
Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 761 n.31 (citing Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 
1280, 1284 (1978) (discussing Pennsylvania's "substantial" factor 
requirement on proving causation). 
 The district court believed that Dr. Wright's statement 
that the Elliott children's illnesses was "related to," rather 
than "caused by," any assumed exposure failed to show a causal 
connection between Tracey's exposure and her leukemia.  It relied 
on Novak v. United States, 865 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1989), in 
rejecting Dr. Wright's report and thus analyzed Dr. Wright's 
report in terms of proximate cause, rather than "but for" cause 
or causation in fact.  In Novak, an expert testified that 
plaintiff's death was "related" to a swine flu vaccination he 
received.  Id. at 720.  This medical opinion was based on the 
expert's assumption that the disease plaintiff suffered was 
caused by a virus.  Tellingly, "no witness for the plaintiff 
could say with scientific or medical certainty that the 
particular vaccine at issue . . . caused [plaintiff's] disorder."  
Id. at 722.  Considered along with the defendant's expert 
testimony that there was no scientific evidence that the vaccine 
was related to the cause of plaintiff's illness, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the 
                     
16
.  Of course, if it could be shown, by cross-examination or 
otherwise, that Dr. Wright used the term "relation" to mean 
"correlation" in the statistical sense instead of cause in either 
the medical or legal sense, the force of his testimony could be 
significantly affected. 
  
district court clearly erred in upholding a finding of causation 
and entering judgment for the plaintiff.  Id. 
 On this appeal, however, we are reviewing the Elliotts' 
claims at the summary judgment stage, and on that basis alone 
Novak is distinguishable.  Whether Dr. Wright's testimony will 
persuade the factfinder that leukemia is caused by toxins of the 
type found at the Park remains to be seen.  For summary judgment 
purposes, however, we believe that the Elliotts have introduced 
sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding causation.  Dr. Wright testified: 
 It has been stated in a standard text of 
oncology that irradiation and exposure to 
toxic chemicals are the most studied 
environmental factors that predispose to 
leukemia.  In another standard text of cancer 
epidemiology, it has also been stated that 
the probable causes of leukemia include a 
range of factors, acting singly or in 
combination, some involving intrinsic host 
mechanisms and others reflecting 
environmental exposures, including radiation, 
chemicals and others. 
 
 
App. at 2190a.  Dr. Wright continued: 
 Some of the chemicals found on [NCAD] 
includ[ing] . . . but not restricted to 
arsenic, cadmium, trichloroethylene, 
chloroform, DDT, PCBS, carcinogenic PAHs, 
hexachlorobenzene, radium, and 
pentachlorophenol. 
 
 Lymphoreticular malignancies in humans have 
been linked to exposure to benzene, 
chloroform, chlorophenols, and 
trichloroethylene.  Animal studies have also 
supported a causal relationship between 
exposure to trichloroethylene, DDT, and 
benzene and lymphoreticular malignancy in 
animals.  A positive statistical association 
  
of childhood leukemia and well water 
contaminated with chlorinated organics, 
including trichloroethylene chloroform has 
been reported.  An increased leukemia 
mortality has been attributed to occupational 
exposure to chemicals, including organic 
solvents, and chlorophenols, all chemicals 
known to be present at Marsh Run Park. 
 
 
Id. at 2191a.  In contrast to Novak, Dr. Wright also testified, 
"based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty," some of 
the chemicals at the Park cause cancer, including acute leukemia, 
and Tracey Elliott's disease is related to her exposure at the 
Park.  Id. at 2233a.17 
 Under Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 750-52, the requirement of 
expert testimony on issues of the type involved here is a matter 
of substantive law governing a plaintiff's burden of proof.  
However, Pennsylvania caselaw on causation does not require that 
expert testimony include any "magic words" such as "caused by," 
rather than "related to."  To the extent that "magic words" have 
any significance in the Pennsylvania cases, they seem merely to 
reflect Pennsylvania's sensible requirement that the expert speak 
"with a reasonable degree of medical certainty."  In Gradel v. 
Inouye, 421 A.2d 674, 679 (Pa. 1980), for example, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania held: 
 Expert medical opinion on causation need not 
be unqualified and absolute, i.e., stated in 
'categorical terms;' ordinarily, it must 
                     
17
.  Of course, if it could be shown, by cross-examination or 
otherwise, that Dr. Wright used the term "relation" to mean 
"correlation" in the statistical sense instead of cause in either 
the medical or legal sense, the force of his testimony could be 
significantly affected. 
  
establish that the injury was, to a 
'reasonable degree of medical certainty,' 
caused by the alleged negligence. 
 
  [When] the complexities of the human 
body place questions as to the cause of pain 
or injury beyond the knowledge of the average 
layperson . . . the law requires that expert 
medical testimony be employed.  In addition 
to its bearing on whether or not the 
defendant's conduct was negligent, such 
testimony is needed to establish that the 
injury in question did, with a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty stem from the 
negligent act alleged. 
 
 
Id. (quoting Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa. 1978) 
(emphasis omitted from original and added)).  We believe Dr. 
Wright spoke with the "reasonable degree of medical certainty" 
required by Pennsylvania caselaw. 
 The district court also concluded that Dr. Wright's 
report did not sufficiently "rebut" the affidavit submitted by 
the Army's expert, Dr. Jandl, stating that leukemia is not caused 
by the types of chemicals found at the Park and that Tracey's 
leukemia and Todd's enlarged lymph nodes therefore cannot be 
causally linked to their exposure.  Dr. Wright's report stated 
that Tracey Elliotts' leukemia is related to her exposure to the 
chemicals found at the Park and that Todd Elliott has an 
increased risk of cancer due to his exposure to the same 
chemicals.  It also states that exposure to certain chemicals, 
including those found at the Park, is among the risk factors 
associated with leukemia.  Dr. Wright and Dr. Jandl simply 
reached different conclusions regarding the cause of the Elliott 
  
children's injuries after reviewing the Elliotts' medical 
records.  Because their opinions conflict as to the fact of 
causation, there remains a genuinely disputed issue of material 
fact on the issue of causation, which is for the factfinder to 
resolve.  It is up to the jury to decide whether the chemicals at 
the Park were a substantial contributory cause of the Elliott 
children's illnesses.  Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Elliotts, the nonmoving party, we believe Dr. 
Wright's report is enough to permit the Elliotts to survive the 
United States' motion for summary judgment on the issue whether 
Todd and Tracey Elliotts' present injuries, including any need 
for special medical monitoring, has been caused by their exposure 
to any toxic substances the Army may have deposited in the 
landfill under the Park in which they played. 
 
 VII.  Discovery Disputes 
 Because we will reverse the district court's order 
granting  summary judgment to the United States on the Elliotts' 
claims, we must consider the discovery issues the appellants 
raise concerning the district court's decision that the 
deliberate process privilege enabled the United States to 
withhold discovery of certain documents that could be relevant or 
likely to lead to the discovery of relevant information.  The 
plaintiffs appeal three discovery related orders, issued by the 
  
district court, which denied their motions to compel production 
of documents.18 
 
 A.  The Deliberative Process Privilege 
 First, the plaintiffs allege that the district court's 
order, dated August 13, 1992, denying their motion to compel 
production of one hundred thirty-nine documents based upon the 
defendants' deliberative process privilege, was an abuse of 
discretion.  The deliberative process privilege permits the 
government to withhold documents containing "confidential 
deliberations of law or policymaking, reflecting opinions, 
recommendations or advice."  In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 959 
(3d Cir. 1987) (citing NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 
150-54 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 & n.16 (1973)), cert. 
                     
18
.  The plaintiffs also challenge the district court's order, 
dated March 4, 1993 granting the defendants' motion to require 
the plaintiffs to travel to the residence or place of business of 
certain witnesses who were sought to be deposed.  The plaintiffs 
contend that it was an abuse of discretion to require them to 
send an attorney there to conduct the depositions and that the 
district court should have ordered the depositions to occur at 
the site of the litigation.  In the end, the plaintiffs deposed 
these individuals by phone and so did not incur the travel 
expense to which they objected.  The plaintiffs now claim this 
was unfair because they were unable "to evaluate the appearance 
and conduct of [the] witnesses."  Reply Brief of Appellants at 
22.  We cannot say, based on this generalized complaint, that the 
district court's order was an abuse of discretion.  See 
Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984) (a district court has broad 
discretion in determining the manner in which discovery is 
conducted.). 
  
denied sub. nom., Colafella v. United States, 484 U.S. 1025 
(1988).19 
 "[T]he ultimate purpose of this long-recognized 
privilege is to prevent injury to the quality of agency 
decisions."  Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 151.  It 
recognizes "that were agencies forced to operate in a fishbowl, 
the frank exchange of ideas and opinions would cease and the 
quality of administrative decisions would consequently suffer."  
First Eastern Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.3d 465, 468 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (quotations and internal ellipses omitted).  The 
deliberative process privilege does not protect factual 
information, even if such information is contained in an 
otherwise protectable document, as long as the information is 
severable.  See In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d at 959.  In addition, 
it does not protect "[c]ommunications made subsequent to an 
agency decision."  United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385,  1389 
(7th Cir. 1993).   
 The privilege, once determined to be applicable, is not 
absolute.  First Eastern Corp., 21 F.3d at 468 n.5; Farley, 11 
F.3d at 1389.  After the government makes a sufficient showing of 
entitlement to the privilege, the district court should balance 
                     
19
.  Our discussion of the deliberative process privilege is 
based, in part, on interpretations of the bank examination 
privilege.  The two privileges are similar and precedent 
concerning them is often relied upon interchangeably.  See, e.g., 
Schreiber v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 11 F.3d 217, 220-
22 (D.C. Cir. 1993); In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller 
of the Currency and the Secretary of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
  
the competing interests of the parties.  The party seeking 
discovery bears the burden of showing that its need for the 
documents outweighs the government's interest.  This Court has 
previously stated that "the party seeking disclosure may overcome 
the claim of privilege by showing a sufficient need for the 
material in the context of the facts or the nature of the case . 
. . or by making a prima facie showing of misconduct."  In re 
Grand Jury, 821 F.2d at 959 (internal citations omitted). The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
recently determined that a district court, in balancing the 
interests, should consider at least the following factors:  
"(i) the relevance of the evidence sought to be protected; 
(ii) the availability of other evidence; (iii) the 'seriousness' 
of the litigation and the issues involved; (iv) the role of the 
government in the litigation; [and] (v) the possibility of future 
timidity by government employees who will be forced to recognize 
that their secrets are violable."  First Eastern Corp., 21 F.3d 
at 468 n.5. 
 Thus, a party's assertion of the deliberative process 
privilege requires a two-step review in the district court.  
First, it must decide whether the communications are in fact 
privileged.  Second, the court must balance the parties' 
interests.  Because the district court did not sufficiently 
explain its rationale in either respect, we will vacate its order 
of August 13, 1992 denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel 
discovery of the 139 documents which the Army claimed the 
  
deliberative process privilege.20  On remand, the district court 
should demonstrate its adherence to the process. 
 The initial burden of showing privilege applies is on 
the government.  See Schreiber v. Society for Savings Bancorp., 
11 F.3d 217, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  To meet it, the government 
must present more than a bare conclusion or statement that the 
documents sought are privileged.  Id.  Otherwise, the agency, not 
the court, would have the power to determine the availability of 
the privilege.  Id. 
 The United States, in support of its assertion of the 
deliberative process, initially gave the district court a list 
and description of fifty-nine requested documents which 
plaintiffs had requested with supporting affidavits.  There it 
states that all the documents fall within one of three 
categories:  "1) [d]raft documents intended only for internal 
review; 2) comments on draft documents; and 3) internal, pre-
decisional notes and memoranda recommending courses of agency 
action."  App. at 1900.  The affidavit then states in general 
terms that the documents in each category are within the purview 
                     
20
.  Our remand on these discovery related orders does not affect 
our affirmance of summary judgment against the plaintiffs who 
were unable to show an injury.  The discovery that was denied 
sought information on violations of law, the defendants' 
knowledge, overall contamination, etc.  See App. at 2334-37.  
These issues go to breach of duty, or violation of law, not to 
the special monitoring that might be necessary from the exposure 
involved here.  See also supra footnote 3.  Unlike the other 
plaintiffs, the Elliotts and their children seek damages beyond 
medical monitoring and have produced evidence showing present 
illness, not just future risk of harm. 
  
of the privilege.21  The listing provided some benefit to the 
district court in its description of the documents, but the 
detail given in the various descriptions varies.  The description 
given for most of the documents withheld provides little more 
than general information indicating which of the three general 
categories the documents fall into.  For example, one document is 
described as "August 1990 draft New Cumberland Army Depot 
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study of the AMSCS."  
                     
21
.  The entire argument the United States presented to the 
district court follows: 
 
 An essential element in the effective 
management of the Army's environmental 
program at Army installations is the 
assurance that the Army, its contractors, and 
other reviewing agencies may engage in free 
and candid discussions while formulating Army 
positions, arriving at Army decisions, and 
preparing final versions of Army documents.  
Draft documents and the comments on draft 
documents listed in attachment 1 are an 
integral part of the deliberational, 
predecisional processes that results in a 
final Army decision.  Editorial changes that 
would be apparent fr[o]m a comparison of the 
draft to the final document reflect the 
personal opinions and mental impressions of 
the drafting and editing staff.  Disclosure 
of draft documents and comments on drafts 
would stifle the editing process and impair 
the frank presentation of ideas that 
accompanies the drafting and finalization of 
Army documents.  Disclosure would, therefore, 
result in an identifiable harm to the public 
interest, namely an impairment of the 
decision making process would result in 
prejudice to the Army's goal of making the 
best possible decisions and producing the 
best possible documents. 
 
App. at 1900-01. 
  
Approximately two months after the filing of the initial 
affidavit and document list, the defendants presented the 
district court with a second affidavit, verbatim except for the 
different date, and a listing of an additional 82 documents for 
which the defendants wished to invoke the privilege.  The 
descriptions of these documents were similarly conclusory. 
 Before this Court, both the United States and the 
Elliotts dispute the reasoning behind the district court's order.  
The Elliotts rely on the district court's use of the phrase 
"compelling reason" in its order to argue that the court erred by 
applying a "compelling reason test."  The United States points to 
the court's use of the word "outweighs" to argue that the 
district court applied the correct balance in the exercise of its 
discretion.  The district court stated: 
  It is understandable that plaintiffs may 
wish access to this material but they state 
no specific or compelling reason to obtain 
any particular item.  Based upon our review 
of the arguments made and authorities cited 
we believe the need to protect the 
predecisional, deliberative process in 
government decision making outweighs the 
general desire of plaintiffs to view this 
material as part of discovery. 
 
 
App. at 2402. 
 We are reluctant, on this record, to decide just what 
the district court meant by the use of any particular word or 
phrase.  Instead, we think the district court should, on remand, 
apply the balancing test as we have outlined it.  It should also 
make any findings of fact that may be needed to support its 
  
implicit conclusion that the documents sought fell under the 
deliberative process privilege, if it so decides on remand.  See 
Comptroller of the Currency, 967 F.2d at 636 (Although the 
district court used the language of balancing, "[n]either the 
order nor the . . . hearing that preceded it indicates with any 
clarity, [] the factors that persuaded the court to [reach] this 
conclusion."); In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d at 959. 
 The district court may elect to perform a preliminary 
in camera review of the documents in question before balancing 
the competing interests and exercising its discretion.  In In re 
Grand Jury, we referred to the Supreme Court's statement in Kerr 
v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 406 (1976), that 
"in camera review is a highly appropriate and useful means of 
dealing with claims of governmental privilege."  In re Grand 
Jury, 821 F.2d at 959.22 
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.  See also In re Franklin Natl. Bank Securities Litig., 478 
F. Supp. at 582 ("Given this clash of strong competing interests, 
the official information privileged usually requires examination 
of documents in camera."); Northrop v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 
751 F.2d 395, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The litigant's need for the 
information cannot be balanced against its sensitive and critical 
role in the government's decision making process without any 
indication of what that information is.").   
 
    The plaintiffs also contend that the district court erred by 
not considering whether the government committed illegal acts, 
the fact that the government is alleged to be a tortfeasor, that 
the individual who characterized the documents could not 
objectively evaluate their deliberative content, that the 
government failed to persuasively show the potential harm from 
disclosure and that the government failed to adequately describe 
the documents.  We believe these tests tend to beg the privilege 
question. 
  
 In considering the United States' assertion of 
privilege, the district court should keep in mind the fact that 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 authorizes broad discovery 
into "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action, [see Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)] but the deliberative process 
privilege, like other executive privileges, should be narrowly 
construed."  See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't. of Energy, 
617 F.2d 854, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & 
Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 716 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (collecting 
cases). 
 
 B.  Waiver of the Privilege 
 The plaintiffs also attack the district court's order, 
dated January 29, 1993, denying their motion to compel discovery 
of five documents.  In this respect, they claim, even if the 
documents were privileged, that the United States has waived its 
privilege.  Waiver is based on the Army's disclosure of these 
five documents in the course of a subsequent response.  The 
district court concluded that this disclosure was "inadvertent" 
and did not qualify as a "voluntary" waiver.  App. at 2621.  See 
Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines 
Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978).  The district court did 
not err when it rejected the plaintiffs' waiver argument. 
 We also reject the plaintiffs' contention that the 
importance of the documents should be factored into the 
determination of whether the government waived its privilege.  
  
The importance of the documents is relevant to the balancing of 
interests, but the plaintiffs refer us to no cases and we find 
none stating that it is relevant to waiver.  Moreover, we believe 
the importance of the documents is immaterial to whether their 
disclosure was voluntary. 
 
 C.  Relevance 
 Finally, the plaintiffs challenge the district court's 
order, dated January 14, 1991, regarding their attempt to compel 
discovery against the Army's contention that the Privacy Act, 5 
U.S.C.A. § 552a(b)(11) (West 1995), covered some of the 
plaintiffs' requests.  In this order, the district court held 
that the Privacy Act did not protect the discovery sought, but 
denied some of the requested discovery as overbroad or 
burdensome.  The plaintiffs contend that the court failed to 
apply the standards this court requires in deciding whether a 
discovery request is overbroad or burdensome.  See Josephs v. 
Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982).  The United 
States responds with a footnote in its brief, stating: 
 The basis for appealing this order is unclear 
given the fact that the district court 
required the United States to supply 
plaintiffs with information which otherwise 
would have been protected by the Privacy Act, 
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11).  This Court should 
reject the appeal because plaintiffs have 
failed to show how the district court abused 
its discretion. 
 
 
Brief of Appellees at 41 n.22. 
  
 In Josephs, we stated "the mere statement by a party 
that the interrogatory was overly broad, burdensome, oppressive 
and irrelevant is not adequate to voice a successful objection to 
an interrogatory."  Josephs, 677 F.2d at 992 (internal quotations 
omitted).  Instead, "the party resisting discovery must show 
specifically how each interrogatory is not relevant or how each 
question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive."  Id. 
(citations, internal ellipses and internal quotations omitted). 
 The record before us has only the district court's 
order which states its conclusion that the discovery requests 
were "overbroad and burdensome."  App. at 1507.  On remand the 
district court might wish to set forth its recognition and use of 
the Josephs standards in support of its conclusion that the 
plaintiffs' request for some documents be overturned. 
 
 VIII.  Conclusion 
 The order of the district court dismissing the claims 
of the Neighbors, the Soccer Plaintiffs and the Township Workers 
will be affirmed.  Its order granting the United States summary 
judgment on the Elliotts' claims will be reversed, and their case 
will be remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 The parties shall each bear their own costs. 
 
